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INTRODUCTION
With all of the controversies surrounding the legalization of recreational marijuana, the
most prominent contention amongst politicians and lawmakers has been how to tax marijuana. 1
With New Jersey inching closer to becoming the next state to legalize recreational marijuana, the
issue with marijuana taxation has made no exception for New Jersey. Some of the principal issues
encompassing marijuana taxation include what type of tax should be used, what should be the
going tax rate, and how should the newly earned tax revenue be disbursed. 2 A majority of
jurisdictions that have legalized recreational marijuana currently use or have used either an excise
tax or a gross-receipt tax. Excise taxes are the taxes paid when purchasing a specific good, where
the tax itself is combined with the price of the product.3 Gross receipts taxes are state taxes on the
gross sales of a business.4 Although many states have shifted between these types of taxes, excise
taxes have been proven to be more economically efficient when compared to gross receipts tax. 5
In determining what tax method is better suited for New Jersey, this Note will detail the history of
marijuana legalization in the United States and New Jersey, lay out the beneficial and negative
aspects of both taxes, and explain why an excise tax should be implemented over a gross receipts
tax.
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I. BACKGROUND
Prior its in the United States, marijuana played a role as an important commodity among
early farmers as a source of hemp. 6 It was not until the when an massive influx of immigrants the
in the 1920s and 1930s coupled with the discovery of marijuana’s hallucinogenic effects that
American society begin to associate marijuana with crime and immigrants. 7 As immigrant workers
began to move and settle throughout the United States, so did marijuana prohibition.8 It was not
until 1937, when Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act that the federal government began their
attempts to regulate marijuana. 9 In effect, the Marijuana Tax Act forced the removal of marijuana
from a list of permissible medicines recognized by the American Medical Association, thus
effectively beginning the prohibition of marijuana. 10 It was only after the passage of the Controlled
Substance Act of 1970, which officially classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug, that marijuana
became illegal in all fifty states.11 The oppressive Controlled Substance Act subjugated persons
who cultivated, processed, distributed, or possessed marijuana with punishment or imprisonment
regardless of the amount of marijuana a person possessed.12
By the mid 1990s, however, the Federal government’s and the general public’s perception
of marijuana began to change. 13 In 1996, voters in California passed Proposition 215 which
allowed citizens of California to purchase medical marijuana so long as the patient received a
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prescription from a certified doctor. 14 Quickly thereafter, in 1998, Alaska, Oregon, and
Washington state followed California’s footsteps and legalized medical marijuana. 15 By January
2009, a total of thirteen states had enacted legislation allowing for the use of medical marijuana. 16
Under President Obama’s tenure as President, many state governments believed that the Obama
administration would make due on their promise to ease the nation’s marijuana laws. 17 This belief
was further reinforced when Deputy Attorney General David Ogden released his memorandum to
U.S. Attorneys around the country, which highlighted new “enforcement priority guidance”
regarding marijuana18 In sum, the memorandum provided that federal resources should not be used
in States on individuals who are “in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana.” 19 Initially, Ogden’s memorandum was seen as
opening the gates for the unrestricted expansion of the marijuana industry. 20 The Department of
Justice released another memorandum in 2013 addressing state misinterpretations regarding
Ogden’s memorandum.21 On August 29, 2013 after months of silence by the Federal government,
Deputy Attorney General James Cole released a new memorandum. 22 The memorandum
highlighted several federal government priorities in combating marijuana which include: (1)
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“Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;” (2) “Preventing revenue from the sale of
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;” (3) Preventing the diversion of
marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states;” (4) Preventing
state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other
illegal drugs or other illegal activity;” (5) Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the
cultivation and distribution of marijuana;” (6) Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of
other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;” (7) Preventing the
growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers
posed by marijuana production on public lands;” and (8) Preventing marijuana possession or use
on federal property.”23 Essentially, where state have legalized recreational marijuana, those states
would be left to their own course of action so long as they are able to show compliance with the
eight governmental priorities.24
The hands-off approach adopted under the Obama administration was overturned by
Attorney General Jeff Sessions memorandum on January 4, 2018.25 Following the Sessions
memorandum, the Trump administration seemingly reverted back to utilizing a hands-on approach
by “direct[ing] all U.S. Attorneys to use previously established prosecutorial principles that
provide them all the necessary tools to disrupt criminal organizations, tackle the growing drug
crisis, and thwart violent crime across the country.” 26 The Sessions memorandum has effectively
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permitted federal prosecutors to use their discretion in enforcing the CSA against all state-legalized
marijuana business. 27 This hands on approach has complicated marijuana legislation
A. Overview of Gross Receipts and Excise Taxes
The Gross-Receipt Tax has gone through a resurgence throughout several States despite
their well-known shortcomings. This section will specifically detail not only what a Gross-Receipt
Tax is, but will also cover state implementation of Gross-Receipt Taxation and discuss the benefits
and criticisms of Gross-Receipt Taxation.28 Generally, a gross receipt tax is a tax on the total gross
revenues of a business, irrespective of the source of income. As a result, the gross receipts tax is
levied on the seller and or producer of goods or the service consumers.29
The gross receipt tax is based on the dollar value of receipts received from either the sale
of goods and services, but does not allow for the exclusion of sale categories nor provides cost
allowance on the part of sellers. 30 Therefore, any business within a gross receipt taxing jurisdiction
must report the total value of their receipts and apply the allocated tax rate to the receipts to
determine how much tax is owed.31 However, it must be noted that many States that implement
gross receipt taxes do allow for the omission of certain categories of receipts, situational cost
adjustments, and differential tax rates among tax categories. 32 Essentially, the ability of the gross
receipt tax to collect taxes from businesses is a primary reason for implementing such a tax.
The principles of business taxation are grounded in the theory of economic efficiency
which dictates that businesses must pay for the cost of their activities and taxation must be uniform
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and neutral. Under the first principle, economic efficiency cannot be achieved unless businesses
are taxed for the costs of their activities. 33 The costs of conducting business activity, also known
as the “social cost” can be designated into two categories of “external costs”. The first category of
“external costs” includes, but is not limited to environmental degradation caused by business
production, or the cost of disposing a product once the product is no longer useful. Although
external costs are never included in the price of the product produced, businesses must still be
taxed for their external costs. The second category of “external costs” encompasses the costs the
government incurs in providing services and facilities for businesses i.e. transportation, fire and
police protection, access to the court system, and infrastructure. Unless the Federal Government
were to internalize these costs, businesses must pay taxes for all the different types of “external
costs”. If businesses were not compelled to pay taxes on “external costs”, the general public would
then bear the brunt of the unpaid taxes, therefore causing economic inefficiency.
However, although economic efficiency requires that businesses are taxed on the cost of
their activities, it further requires that businesses are taxed uniformly. 34 Economic efficiency
through the lens of uniformity looks to ensure that the relative prices of a commodity remains
unchanged, “unless tax differentials can be linked to differences in social costs”. 35 As a result,
because economic efficiency takes account of different social costs between businesses it requires
differential taxing between businesses. This translates to an efficient tax rate even though it appears
to alter the relative price of a commodity. The effect of such a tax rate leads to the appearance that
differential taxation transgresses the bounds of uniform and neutral taxation. 36 However, to the
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extent that the taxes are neutral, the tax rates effect on relative prices is not violative of
uniformity.37 Furthermore, by directly taxing businesses, compliance and administrative costs
should begin to decline, thus falling in line with the principles of business taxation. 38
For example, in Washington, recreational marijuana first became available at retail stores
on July 8, 2014.39 As dictated by Washington’s regulation of the recreational marijuana market
has created a supply chain consisting of three types of firms each dedicated with a different task. 40
Cultivators, who comprise the base of the Washington’s legal marijuana supply chain, are in
charge with the growing of the cannabis plant from seedling until maturity. 41 Once the plant has
reached maturity, the plants are sent to the second stage of the supply chain, the processors. 42 The
processor then converts the raw marijuana plant into marijuana that is suitable for consumption
before sending the product to retailers at the final stage of the supply chain. 43 The retailers then
take the processed marijuana and sell it directly to the consumer. 44 Additionally, it is also important
to consider that each different firm within the Washington supply chain must comply with state
law and turn over detailed information regarding their operations.45 As a result, researchers in
Washington are now able to assess the legal marijuana market and develop better taxation
methods.46
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Prior to July 1, 2015, Washington effectuated a gross receipts tax of 25% at each stage of
the recreational marijuana supply chain. 47 Under the original gross-receipt tax structure, cultivators
would be taxed 25% on the revenue gained from the sales of grown marijuana to processors.48
Processor would then be taxed 25% on the revenue made from selling processed marijuana to
retailers.49 Finally, retailers would be taxed 25% on profits gained by selling recreational marijuana
to consumers.50 Initially, Washington’s implementation of their gross receipts tax was successful.
However, due to Washington’s unique licensing laws, cultivators were permitted to obtain the
license needed to become processors, but processors could not obtain a retail licenses.51
Washington’s licensing laws effectively created the problem of vertical integration within the
recreational marijuana market, thus negating the gross receipts taxes’ ability to maintain economic
efficiency.52 Ultimately, it was the issue of vertical integration that compelled Washington to
abandon the gross receipts tax. 53
B. Excise Tax
Generally, what makes an excise tax so unique is related to the taxes’ selectivity in what is
taxed, its facially discriminatory intent, and often adheres to a form of quantitative measurement
in deciding the tax liability. 54 Essentially, excise taxes comprise all consumption-based taxes
levied by the government on tobacco, alcohol, gambling, pollution, driving, other specific goods,
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services, and activities.55 For all intent and purposes, the major reason excise taxes are usually
enacted is for generating revenue without the need of a complex taxation system in place to capture
all the revenue.56 However, it is important to note that the efficiency of excise taxes has more to
do with what is being taxed than how the tax works.

Good potential sources of revenue such as tobacco, alcohol and marijuana are easily
identifiable products that have a high sale volume and are produced by no more than several
corporations, which streamlines the collection of taxes on these products.57 Moreover, the fact that
there are limited substitutions for these products in the open-market causes the consumption of
these products to remain high irrespective of increased prices due to excise taxation. 58 The reason
the government is able to impose higher tax rates on these products is grounded in the products’
inelasticity. This means that the prices of these product are not dependent on the supply or demand
of the product itself.59 For example, most Americans require gasoline to work or travel, therefore,
although the price of gasoline may rise due to a tax increase on oil, most of Americans will
continue to purchase the same amount of gas.60 In sum, the ability of the government to subjugate
these products to a higher tax rate is based in the products inherent inability to be duplicated,
therefore suggesting that people will continue to purchase these types of products regardless of the
final consumer purchase price.
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C. New Jersey and Marijuana Taxation

The purpose of this section is to lay out the structure of the New Jersey recreational
marijuana market and method of taxation. Prior to delving into the preferred system of taxation
and why that method of taxation would be best for a New Jersey, it is important to establish the
base of the recreational marijuana market and to discuss the issues the state is currently facing with
the legalization of recreational marijuana in terms of public opinion.

I. Public Opinion:

Currently in the State of New Jersey, marijuana is only permitted for medical use. A
majority of New Jersey’s citizens support the legalization and taxation of marijuana for adults over
the age of 21.61According to the Rutgers-Eagleton poll released in 2018, approximately 33 percent
of New Jersey residents strongly support legalizing recreational marijuana, so long as the
recreational marijuana industry is regulated and taxed.62 Furthermore, another 25 percent of New
Jerseyans somewhat support the idea of legalizing recreational marijuana. 63 Although a majority
of New Jersey’s citizen support the legalization of marijuana in some form, there is still a large
minority who strongly oppose any legislation legalizing marijuana, approximately 25 percent.64

Initially, it was New Jersey state Senator Scutari who introduced Senate Bill 1896 which
intended to legalize, tax, and regulate marijuana similar to the system implemented in Colorado,
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with “marijuana regulated like alcohol at every step of the production and sales process.”65
Supporters of marijuana legalization, taxation, and regulation emphasize that the tax revenue
generated from the sale of recreational marijuana could generate substantial sums of money that
could help fund several categories of projects in New Jersey.66 According to the 2015 RutgersEagleton Poll, approximately 36 percent of residents supporting marijuana legalization assert that
the new tax revenue could be prioritized into three categories: education, drug treatment programs
and transportation infrastructure. 67 However, it should be noted that there are huge racial
disparities when determining how tax revenue should be allocated. For example, 46 percent of
non-white residents would rather have the additional tax revenue invested in education as
compared with 30 percent of white residents. 68 In contrast, non-white residents are 50 percent less
likely to allocate the marijuana tax revenue to transportation and social services. 69 One shocking
piece of data discovered by the 2015 poll was the noticeable difference of opinion between political
parties, specifically between Republicans and Democrats.70 Democrats are more than likely to
support legislation legalizing recreation marijuana. 71 More than six out of ten Democrats support
legalization with 39 percent strongly agreeing with legislation and 25 percent somewhat
supporting legislation of recreational marijuana. 72 On the other hand, only 41 percent of
Republicans agree with legalizing recreational marijuana and of those 41% only 18 percent
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strongly support marijuana legalization. 73 Furthermore, approximately 46 percent of Republicans
strongly oppose the legalization of marijuana. 74 Interestingly, when comparing the RutgersEagleton poll of 2014, the amount of Republican support has substantially increased “legalizing,
taxing, and regulating for adult use – garners much more GOP support than we saw a year ago
when we asked about completely legalizing marijuana. Then only 28 percent of Republicans
agreed; here it is 41 percent.”75

The 2018 Rutgers-Eagleton poll has established that an overwhelming percentage of New
Jerseyans support marijuana legalization although there are concerns that New Jersey citizens are
still split about.76 For example, New Jersey citizens are divided about the extent to which marijuana
would be acting as a gateway drug with 21 percent believing that marijuana legalization would
increase use of other drugs while 27 percent believe that there will be a decrease in the use of other
drugs.77 Opinion is also split about whether or not legalization will increase or decrease the amount
of violent crimes, with 21 percent believing that it will increase and 27 percent that it will
decrease.78 With all things considered, the prospects are still positive, 64 percent of New Jersey
citizens believe that legalization of marijuana will substantially improve or help the state’s
economy, and 57 percent of citizens believe that legalization will decrease the high arrest records
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for marijuana in the state. 79 In understanding the public’s opinion about the legalization of
marijuana, it allows further analysis into the legal issues in the state.

II. Political and Social Issues:
In New Jersey, marijuana prohibition has been in full effect for a little over eighty years.80
However, recent findings suggest that the laws enforcing marijuana prohibition have led to several
adverse effects.81 From the year 2000 through 2013, arrests for marijuana possession by New
Jersey law enforcement has increased by 26 percent.82 By 2016, arrest rates for marijuana increased
to a staggering 400 arrests per 100,000 people becoming the second highest arrest rate in the
nation.83 As a result, New Jersey spends approximately $130 million per year to enforce marijuana
prohibition.84 Besides the cost associated with enforcing marijuana prohibition, another issue
compounding the high arrest rate is the observable racial disparities in New Jersey marijuana
arrests.85 In a study conducted between 2000 through 2013 by the ACLU on racial disparities in
New Jersey’s marijuana arrest rates, New Jersey residents of African-American decent were three
times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession, although consumption rates were similar
to White residents.86 When beginning the study in 2000, it was found that compared to White
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residents, African-Americans were 2.2 times more likely to be arrested. 87 By 2013, the average
New Jersey resident of African-American decent was 11.3 times more likely to be arrested for
marijuana possession. 88 One of the key recommendation made by the ACLU to stem this racial
disparity was for New Jersey to legalize, tax, and regulate marijuana for those over the age of 21. 89
This racial disparity has been a keystone in Governor Murphy’s attempt to legalize marijuana as
he has repeatedly stated that social justice is the purpose of marijuana legalization. 90

On March 5th, 2019, Governor Murphy delivered a state budget address, which in part
dealt with the projected revenue earnings recreational marijuana would expect if legalized. 91 His
administration projected tax revenue to exceed $60 million within a six-month period.92 Both
notions of financial gain and social justice were both largely considered when Gov. Philip Murphy
and leaders of the Democratic State Legislature finally threw their support behind a proposed bill
that would have legalized recreation marijuana in New Jersey.93 However, despite the data from
statewide polls indicating strong support for marijuana legalization, many lawmakers remained
unsure and or opposed because of the issues legalization would bring forth.94 Some of the issues
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Lawmakers had with marijuana legalization dealt with how marijuana taxation would be
implemented in the State, the increased rates of impaired driving, and the effect marijuana
legalization would have on the public health.95 Ultimately, it was the issue of “whether it was
necessary to expunge criminal records for marijuana-related offenses for those found with as much
as five pounds of [marijuana]” that proved to be a major source of contention. 96 Essentially, this
provision in the bill would expunge the criminal record of any New Jersey resident who had been
convicted of marijuana related offenses while possessing up to five pounds of marijuana. 97 On one
hand, many lawmakers insist that expungement for marijuana related offenses is too high and
would create a public safety concern, while other lawmakers assert that it would be hypocritical to
prevent those who have served their time prior to legalization from getting work due to their
criminal history.98 This dispute has prevented party leaders from changing the provision at the risk
that they would lose more support than gain by amending the provision.99 Although Governor
Murphy and his constituents have a large hold on state government, inter-party disputes and the
lack of required votes led to the decision to pull the bill. 100
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Notwithstanding the major roadblocks to legalizing marijuana in New Jersey, Governor
Murphy has recently announced a May deadline to pass a bill legalizing marijuana. 101 Moreover,
Governor Murphy mentioned that if the May vote did not pass muster he would then take executive
action to expand the already established medical marijuana industry in New Jersey. 102

III. The New Jersey Marijuana Supply Chain

The purpose of this section is two-fold, first this section will detail the intricacies of
establishing a hypothetical recreational marijuana supply chain in New Jersey, and the legal
implications that may arise depending on how New Jersey decides to structure their supply-chain.
It should be emphasized how important defining the supply chain is to collecting reliable tax
revenue data.

To begin, New Jersey should follow the basic supply chain structure currently being
utilized in many jurisdictions where marijuana is legal. Cultivators would form the base of the
marijuana supply chain. As previously mentioned their job requires them to grow the plant from
seedling to maturity. The next stage of the marijuana supply chain would be processors, who
process the marijuana plant to marijuana bud fit for consumption. Finally, the processed marijuana
bud would make its way to dispensaries who form the final relevant part of the supply chain; they
sell the processed marijuana directly to the consumers.

101
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II. CULTIVATORS, PROCESSORS, AND RETAILERS
Although the proposed supply chain seems simple enough, there are some specific issues
that must be addressed before New Jersey opens the supply chain to New Jersey citizens. One of
the leading issues deals with whether New Jersey would allow cultivators to grow the marijuana
plant within the state or would New Jersey import their marijuana from other states. On the one
hand, if New Jersey were to allow cultivators to grow marijuana within the states border, New
Jersey may be opening itself up to attack from federal agencies who still have an interest in
enforcing marijuana prohibition. This means New Jersey cultivators would have to deal with the
constant threat of the federal government’s interference, unless there is a change in federal
marijuana laws or the federal marijuana prohibition ends.103 Put differently, New Jersey could do
little to curb the federal government from interfering with cultivators. Cultivators are highly
susceptible to interferences from government agencies because they are highly visible. 104 The land
on which cultivators grow marijuana is easily visible and holds a large enough amount of
marijuana that attracts governmental interference. 105 Furthermore, the fact that marijuana remains
illegal under federal law has several implications on New Jersey’s marijuana industry. For
instance, banks cannot lawfully provide financial services to the marijuana industry, thus it implies
that only those who have enough liquid capital can start such a venture, therefore, effectively
preventing those most affected by marijuana prohibition from partaking in the industry. Although
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federal governmental interferences may slightly hinder state governments from maximizing their
respective marijuana industry’s profitability, other states have demonstrated that federal
interference, albeit a nuisance, does not outweigh the benefits marijuana legalization and taxation
have brought to their states.

Conversely, if New Jersey were to prevent cultivators from growing the marijuana plant in
the state, cultivators would no longer be pertinent to the marijuana supply chain because states
would import their raw marijuana from established marijuana cultivators from interstate sources.
Although such a provision would decrease the levels of interference from government agencies
intrastate, it would however also come with separate and distinct issues. One such problem arises
under the Commerce Clause. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate, or even
proscribe, marijuana within interstate commerce, as well as exercise a certain degree of incidental
authority. In view of the countervailing issues surrounding cultivators, the former provision would
benefit New Jersey much more until Congress decides to end marijuana prohibition. 106

Processors and retailers face an even larger threat stemming from the federal prohibition
of marijuana possession and distribution. Specifically, marijuana possession and distribution
offenses fall under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 107
Effectively, this puts processors and retailers under direct threat from civil RICO suits, irrespective
of whether possession and distribution is permissible under state law. 108 Stated differently, any
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firm that possess, transports, and/or distributes marijuana will be committing a federal offense. 109
Again, the issues expressed with respect to cultivators will also be prevalent to processors and
distributors. If retailers or processors are restricted from purchasing marijuana from interstate
cultivators or vice versa, commerce clause issues would arise.

Although there are several legitimate concerns regarding how to establish the marijuana
supply chain, other states have shown that the benefits of establishing an intrastate supply chain
outweighs the negatives. Therefore, New Jersey should adopt a three-step supply chain comprised
of cultivators, processors, and retailers.

III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this section is to highlight the benefits of implementing an excise tax over
a gross-receipts tax. There are several important pieces of data that must be analyzed to
successfully determine why an excise tax is better than a gross receipts tax. First, Washington will
be a case study to highlight the deficiencies of a gross receipts tax and the strengths of excise taxes.
Next, by looking to other states where recreational marijuana is legal and determining the
percentage of people in those states who use marijuana those figures can then be extrapolated to
New Jersey. Further, the analysis will look to propose a specific tax rate on marijuana in New
Jersey. The analysis will then look to the results of applying a gross receipts tax and an excise tax
on marijuana in New Jersey. Finally, an in-depth comparison of the results will lead to the final
assessment of which method of taxation is more beneficial to New Jersey, ultimately excise tax
being the winner.
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A. WASHINGTON SAMPLE I
To better comprehend the issues with the application of a gross-receipt tax on recreational
marijuana, guidance can be found from looking at how the State of Washington implemented their
own gross-receipt tax on the recreational marijuana market.
Prior to July 1, 2015, Washington effectuated a gross receipts tax of 25% at each stage of
the recreational marijuana supply chain. 110 Under the original gross-receipt tax structure,
cultivators would be taxed 25% on the revenue gained from the sales of grown marijuana to
processors.111 Processor would then be taxed 25% on the revenue made from selling processed
marijuana to retailers. 112 Finally, retailers would be taxed 25% on profits gained by selling
recreational marijuana to consumers.113 Initially, Washington achieved success with the
implementation of their gross receipts tax. However, due to Washington’s unique licensing laws,
cultivators were permitted to obtain the license needed to become processors, but processors could
not obtain a retail licenses.114 Washington’s licensing laws effectively created the problem of
vertical integration within the recreational marijuana market. Thus negating the gross receipts
taxes’ ability to maintain economic efficiency. 115 Ultimately, it was the issue of vertical integration
that compelled Washington to abandon the gross receipts tax. 116
B. CRITICISMS OF THE GROSS RECEPTS TAX
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In the most general sense, vertical integration occurs when a single firm owns multiple or
successive parts of the supply chain hierarchy. 117
In Washington, vertical integration was abundant among cultivators, with approximately
95% of cultivators carried a license to process and cultivate marijuana. 118 Under Washington’s
gross receipt tax, any vertically integrated cultivators would avoid paying taxes on “internal
transfers of marijuana.”119 Therefore, vertical integration in Washington’s recreational marijuana
market diminished the taxable portion of the supply chain preventing the state from fully benefiting
under the gross receipts tax scheme. 120 Furthermore, in light of the 25% gross receipts tax,
vertically integrated firms forego the opportunity to sell their own raw materials to other processors
or purchase raw materials from other cultivators to avoid the tax. This prevents vertically
integrated firms from efficiently participating in the legal marijuana market, further compounding
Washington’s tax issues under the gross receipt tax. 121 In sum, it is clear that gross receipts taxes,
under Washington’s system, lead to unhealthy levels of vertical integration. Ultimately,
Washington recognizing the deficiencies with the gross receipts tax introduced tax reform under
House Bill 2136.122
C. WASHINGTON SAMPLE II
Looking to Washington’s tax reform, the shift from a gross-receipts tax that imposed a
25% tax within the supply chain, to an excise tax created a more economically efficient method of
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taxing.123 The reform enacted a retail tax rate of 37% while contemporaneously eliminating the
25% tax assessment between each transfer of marijuana. 124 To understand the substantial effect
the tax reform had on the marijuana industry in Washington, each part of the supply chain must be
independently observed.125

When looking at cultivators and processors together before the tax reform, cultivators did
not want to vertically integrate but could not thrive under the gross receipt tax unless they vertically
integrated.126 Essentially, the tax not only compelled the firms to vertically integrate, but also
prevented the vertically integrated firms from being able to purchase or sell their marijuana to
other firms in lieu of the 25% tax.127 As a result, only 5% of the marijuana sold by processors were
from dis-integrated marijuana while 93% came from vertically integrated marijuana. 128
Specifically when looking at cultivators, vertical integration was a widespread issue under the
gross receipts tax, however, the implementation of the excise tax significantly reduced the
incentive for firms to vertically integrate. 129 Pre-tax reform, approximately 95% of cultivators were
vertically integrated. 130 After the tax reform however, cultivators no longer had to circumvent the
tax on transfers of marijuana between firms by vertically integrating successive parts of the supplychain.131 As a result, within the first week of the switch, the amount of vertically integrated
marijuana sales declined by 16% and the portion of vertically dis-integrated marijuana increased
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by 105%.132 However, it is important to note that although cultivators no longer had an incentive
to vertically integrate, established cultivators did not have an incentive to dis-integrate their firms
even though dis-integration would be more efficient in the absence of the gross receipts tax. 133
Moreover, processors benefited substantially under the new tax reform. 134 Prior to the tax reform,
processors would receive the after-tax price while retailers would pay the list price. 135 When
analyzing the effect of the tax on the prices charged to retailers, the after-tax prices, and the total
number of sales, the only notably changes were the changes in list price and the after-tax price.136
Accordingly, the price charged to retailers by processors fell by 8% while contemporaneously
increasing the tax-inclusive price processors received by 21%.137 The decrease in the price charged
to retailers and the increase in the after-tax price received by processors suggests that the gross
receipts tax substantially interfered with the profitability of the legal marijuana market in
Washington.138

Finally, retailers, unlike cultivators and processors were not allowed to vertically integrate
under Washington law.139 Therefore, the effect of the tax reform on retailers changed the retail tax
from a 25% gross receipts tax to an 37% excise tax. 140 Further, the tax reform also switched the
state sales tax to a tax-exclusive price from a tax-inclusive price.141 The goal of the tax reform in
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the retail market was to keep the revenue neutral.142 Pre-tax reform, the average tax revenue
collected on a gram of marijuana was $3.46. 143 Post-tax reform, the average taxes paid on a gram
of marijuana decreased a few cents to $3.42, therefore achieving their goal of neutrality. 144 It is
important to highlight that under the new tax regime retailers oversaw collecting and paying all
the taxes, which streamlined the tax collection process for the state government. 145 Furthermore,
when considering the added sales tax into the scenario, the total amount of taxes collected prior to
the change was $4.51 and after the change decreased by 28 cents to $4.23. 146

Moreover, processors before the tax change paid out $1.03 in taxes for each gram of
marijuana sold. The significance of what processors paid is relevant to the discussion because
although the tax reform did decrease the taxes paid overall by 28 cents, the remaining balance was
shifted from the processors to the retailers. As a result of the tax shift, it follows that processors
should have lowered their prices by approximately 75 cents (the amount shifted to retailers),
however, processors lowered their price per gram of marijuana by only 26 cents. 147 The implication
of the tax shift means the that retail tax rate increased by 7% and consumers saw an increase of
2.33%. The total amount of taxes faced by the consumers due to the tax pass-through is 33%.148
In sum, when considering all the cost shifting, it seems that although the revenue generated by
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shifting from a gross receipts tax to an excise tax would remain neutral, the consumers would be
charged with the marginal costs associated with the tax changes. 149

The Washington example is the perfect illustration of what challenges New Jersey would
face if they were to implement a gross receipts tax over an excise tax. By choosing a gross receipt
tax, New Jersey would face the same problems of multiple taxation and vertical integration that
Washington faced.

i. Percentage of Marijuana Users in New Jersey
By determining the percentage of marijuana consumers in jurisdictions where marijuana is
legal and regulated, it will allow for the allocation of a reliable percentage of marijuana users in
the state of New Jersey from which to extrapolate results. Specifically, the analysis will look to
include the percentage of marijuana users who have consumed marijuana in the year of 2016 in
the states of including but not limited to Colorado, Oregon, Washington. According to the 2016
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration report, in states where recreational
marijuana is legal, the average percentage of marijuana users who have consumed marijuana at
least once in the year of 2016 is 19.5 percent.150 Therefore, going forward 19.5 percent will be
used as the set percentage of marijuana consumers for the state of New Jersey to obtain clear
results. It is important to note that this percentage is only an average and may not reflect the actual
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percentage of marijuana consumers in the state of New Jersey. Moreover, based Colorado (665,134
lbs.)151 Washington (330,000 lbs.)152 7.5 million 9 million
New Jersey’s population is currently 9.06 million people, according to the most recent
estimates.153 Roughly 1,776,700 million New Jersey resident would consume marijuana at least
once in a given year by applying the 19.5 percent average to the New Jersey population.
TAX RATE
This section of the analysis will look to set the going tax rate on marijuana in New Jersey.
To do this there are several factors that must be taken into consideration. First, analyzing the going
tax rate on marijuana in other jurisdictions must be done to provide useful insight in determining
the applicable tax rate for New Jersey. Next, the Laffer scale must be utilized to determine whether
the proposed tax rate is economically efficient for generating tax revenue. By setting a tax rate, the
results of any method of taxation will be clear and consistent.
COLORADO
In 2016, Colorado generated sales of $875 million from its cannabis market, an increase
from $588 million the year prior. 154 The massive growth of the marijuana industry has generated
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significant tax revenue. Cultivators in Colorado currently face a 15 percent excise tax on the first
transfer of unprocessed marijuana to manufacturers, retailers, or other cultivators. 155 All sales of
cannabis were hit with a 15 percent special tax in addition to the state sales tax of 2.9 percent. 156
Colorado seems to be having a lot of success under their current tax regiment, however, it is
significant to point out that the main reason marijuana taxes are not higher is due to Colorado
law.157 Any increase of the excise or sales tax rate would need approval the approval of the state
legislature.158 This means, that although Colorado’s current tax rate is effective and economically
efficient, it is not necessarily indicative that Colorado currently implements the best going tax rate
on marijuana according to the Laffer scale. It should be noted that in 2018, Colorado generated
$266,529,637 million in marijuana taxes.159
WASHINGTON
In 2017, Washington state collected approximately $319 million in tax revenue.160 Among
states that allow the recreational use of marijuana, Washington’s 37 percent state excise tax on
marijuana is the highest going tax rate on marijuana in the country.161 Although many believed
that Washington would be unable to sustain their record-breaking tax revenue gains, Washington
is still projected to increase the amount of tax revenue generated with total marijuana revenues
expected to grow by $75 million by 2019. 162 The reason Washington is able to sustain is because
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their going tax rate of 37 percent is because it is at the peak of the Laffer scale. 163 In other words,
Washington has been able to find an optimal tax rate that would generate the most income without
burdening consumers to the point where they would forgo purchasing marijuana.
OREGON
In Oregon, the state legislature set the going tax rate on marijuana at 17 percent, but also
added provisions that would allow for certain counties to add an extra 3 percent tax.164 Despite
Oregon having some of the lowest taxes on marijuana, the state government was still able to collect
$70 million in taxes in the 2016-2017 that increased a further $12 million in 2018.165 The low tax
rate coupled with greater than expected tax revenue generation suggests that even a going tax rate
at the lower end of the Laffer scale can still attain economic efficiency.
Proposed Tax Rate for New Jersey:
After gauging the effects of different tax rates along the Laffer scale, a 30 percent tax rate
for New Jersey would be optimal. New Jersey has a high population and is near major metropolitan
areas. If New Jersey were to legalize recreational marijuana it would be the only state in the tristate
area to have done so. Essentially, not only would New Jersey benefit from intrastate consumers,
but interstate consumers flocking from the surrounding areas to partake in the legal market. These
factors tend to prove that New Jersey’s legal marijuana, as a commodity, would be inelastic with
high demand and no substitutions, therefore justifying a tax rate of 30 percent.
RESULTS
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The purpose of this section is to determine the best method of taxation for New Jersey to
adopt. To accomplish this, the proposed tax rate and the estimated percentage of New Jersey
marijuana consumers must be used in applied to the specific method of taxation. For purposes of
this section the figures will be applied to the excise tax.
If New Jersey were to implement an excise tax, the brunt of the tax would be felt by the
consumers. To obtain an estimate number showing the amount of money that could be made from
taxing marijuana in New Jersey, a mathematical equation must be used. For purposes of this
section, the analysis will be limited to the states of Washington, Colorado, and Oregon. As
mentioned previously, to predict the percentage of New Jersey residents that would use marijuana,
the average percentage of marijuana users of every state with recreational marijuana was added
and then divided by the number of states to come to up with the 19.5 percent marijuana use rate in
New Jersey. Next, the average sales revenue of marijuana from each relevant state must be
gathered. Finally, the average population of each state used in the study must be brought into the
equation as well. The combined average sales revenue of marijuana for the states of Washington
($975,287,777.00),

Colorado

($1,128,727,015.00),

and

Oregon

($502,279,422.00)

is

approximately $868,764,738 million.166 Moreover, the combined average population for the states
of Washington (7,405,743), Colorado (5,607,154), and Oregon (4,142,776) is approximately
5,718,673 people.167
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The equation that will be used to predict the tax revenue for New Jersey will be A * (NJ
Tax Rate) * (NJ Population/B); A indicates the average sale revenue of marijuana and B indicates
the average population of the states. Therefore, when applying the numbers to the equation
({868,764,738 * 30%} *{9,000,600/5,718,673}), New Jersey will generate approximately
$410,203,760.60 by taxing marijuana.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, New Jersey should implement an excise tax as the state would
see immediate benefit without having to deal with issues posed by using a gross receipts tax. The
excise tax is an easy and economically efficient method of taxation to produce a significant amount
of revenue quickly.
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